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Whither the Concept "Affected with a
Public Interest"?
Sterry R. Waterman*
This article is the text of the first Cecil Sims Lecture,
delivered by the Honorable Sterry R. Waterman at the Van-
derbilt University School of Law in April, 1972. The Cecil
Sims Lectureship Series was established to bring to the Law
School distinguished men with extensive legal experience to
associate informally with faculty and students. This address
represents but one of the many contributions made by Judge
Waterman during the week he spent at Vanderbilt Law School.
Cecil Sims, a 1914 graduate of Vanderbilt Law School,
was a distinguished member of the Nashville Bar and served
as a member of the Vanderbilt University Board of Trust. Mr.
Sims taught at the Law School for many years, bringing to his
lectures the full benefit of his wide experience as an outstand-
ingly successful practitioner of the law. The Sims family has
made possible the continuation of that tradition by establishing
the Cecil Sims Lectureship Series.
Dean Knauss, Dean Wade, members of the distinguished law fac-
ulty at Vanderbilt University, fellow students of the law, and all other
ladies and gentlemen:
It is a great honor for me and for the court of which I have been a
member for over sixteen years to have been selected at this time in the
history of our profession for the privilege of delivering the first Cecil
Sims Lecture. For it would seem that today, more than at any time prior
to this, lawyers, judges, and law professors are very seriously studying
the impact of the profession upon the life of our times and devoting a
good bit of thoughtful questioning relative to whither the profession
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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itself, and the legal concepts we have been familiar with, today are
tending.
This time, like all times, is indeed a great time in which to be alive,
but in everything-particularly in the law-it is a period of transition,
and a violent one at that; but I suppose all periods are periods of
transition, though some of course are quieter periods than others. For
instance, at the very beginning of life it is quite reliably reported in the
most read book in the world that Adam, as he was leaving the Garden
of Eden with his former rib on his arm and his new found Adam's apple
in his throat, turned to Eve and said, "Eve, dear, it's quite clear we're
passing through a period of transition."
I have chosen a topic which relates to the public interest because
those words, "public interest," seem to have taken on a special signifi-
cance for today's law students. Perhaps this may in large part be due
to a rather appealing image of Nader's Raiders galloping across the
horizon under a banner emblazoned with the words "public interest." I
submit, however, that if there is any one particular thing to be learned
from "Naderism awareness," it is the increasingly important role the
federal judiciary plays in the implementation of areas of endeavor which
any group in society may consider to be in the public interest. For with
all due deference to the oft-stated position of those who used to say that
the common law was the perfection of reason and that newly-
pronounced constitutional interpretations had always been hidden in the
courthouses' woodwork, it is no news to you that appellate courts in this
country do more than simply read, interpret, and apply the law accord-
ing to eighteenth and nineteenth century standards. In any conscientious
and responsible approach to the interpretation of the Constitution and
statutes and their reach into our lives, these judicial interpreters do not
view their role apart from the public's interest in that reach. That ap-
proach has manifested itself most clearly in the interpretation by the
courts of the century-old Civil Rights Acts which were rather suddenly
rejuvenated by the vaccination needle of Monroe v. Pape.' Probably
nothing that an enlightened bar, with assistance from the High Court
and Congress, as accessories before, at, and after the fact, has done in
the name of the public interest has thrust the federal judiciary more
thoroughly into the lives of all of us than has the activity of the past
twenty years of lawyer and public discovery of the civil rights area.
That's what I'd like to talk about.
It may be true that the Supreme Court has in the past few years
handed down flashier and more widely heralded opinions in cases in-
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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volving reapportionment or the rights of suspected or accused criminals,
but in my estimation the reach of the 1961 ruling in Monroe v. Pape,
which was followed closely by McNeese v. Board of Education2 and
Damico v. California3 was subtler and at the same time far more
pervasive. At that time, the court of last resort, with a somewhat novel
approach to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, reversed the trends, overruled two
lower courts, and in the familiar language of Viewers With Alarm,
"opened the floodgates" that had held back the long overdue civil rights
tide. Since that time, the federal docket has been overflowing with cases
involving, inter alia, false arrests, hair styles, and nude pictures. If such
cases do not extend the reach of the federal judiciary into private lives
"in the public interest," I am amused to know why they don't, and if
they don't, I'm at a loss to know what would!
Thankfully, section 1983 is short enough to be read in its entirety:
Section 1983. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights.-Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
That sounds innocent enough. It was passed by Congress originally
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and for about 90 years it had
lain dormant and dusty, seldom having been invoked by lawyers after
quite early having been narrowly construed by the courts. That is, until
the Court ruled in Monroe v. Pape.
Before the Court in that case was an outrageous fact situation. The
complaint alleged that Mr. Monroe and his family had been rousted
from their beds in the early morning hours by thirteen Chicago police-
men who had broken into their home. Their home was ransacked while
Mr. Monroe and his family stood naked in the living room. Then the
police held Mr. Monroe incommunicado for ten hours on "open"
charges and interrogated him regarding a two-day old murder.
The petitioner brought his grievances to the federal courts, alleging
that the "feds" had jurisdiction under section 1983. The district court
dismissed the claim, and that dismissal was affirmed in the Seventh
Circuit.4
When the case arrived in the Supreme Court, the police officers had
two primary arguments. First, they contended that because their actions
were admittedly contrary to the laws of the State of Illinois, they de-
2. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
3. 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiam).
4. 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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prived the Monroes of their privacy by having committed common-law
wrongs, and hence did not deprive the Monroes of their constitutional
fourth amendment right "under the color of . . .statute" as required
by section 1983. This argument, quite understandably, got them judicial
goose eggs. Moreover, they argued that since there existed a state court
remedy, the issue of their liability should be left to the state courts.
The High Court dismissed both of these arguments by ruling that
a state official's actions may, for the purposes of section 1983, be under
color of state law, even though those actions are in violation of the state
law. Moreover, in a ruling for which we find but very little decisional
precedent as of then, except a sophisticated taking of "judicial notice"
of the nature of our federalism, Justice Douglas stated, and I quote, "It
is no answer that the state has a law which, if enforced, would give
relief.15 In McNeese and Damico, the Court reiterated its position that
state-provided remedies are irrelevant to the issue of whether an individ-
ual may in the first instance pursue in the federal courts his claim that
his civil rights have been violated, precisely as he could then pursue a
habeas corpus action there.
I have no doubt that the Supreme Court was fully aware of the
fantastic increase in the number and types of cases which it was bringing
into the federal courts. Clearly, however, its decision to recognize, in
effect, a federal forum for a wide variety of grievances was not predi-
cated upon an abstract reading of section 1983 but rather, you must
agree with me, it was made in light of certain policy considerations, the
furtherance of which the Court considered to be in "the public interest."
I'd like just to outline briefly what I think were some of the policy
considerations involved in that ruling. First, when we are talking about
constitutional limitations upon interference with a person's federally
derived civil rights, the primary reservoir of expertise is in the federal
courts, where the impact of the Bill of Rights upon all of us and particu-
larly its impact upon majority action to the detriment of minorities has
been litigated for many, many decades. The federal judiciary is on the
firing line daily when problems arising under United States statutory
and constitutional law are presented for adjudication, and this area of
adjudication simply has not been the usual grist in the state courts.
Moreover, for obvious reasons, the potential for uniform, country-wide
application of the law is greater in the federal courts than in the 50 court
hierarchies of 50 diverse states. Uniformity of application is of para-
mount importance, of course, when the constitutional rights of individu-
als, irrespective of the neighborhood of domicile, are to be defined.
5. 365 U.S. at 183.
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But the key factor, the one which I think goes to the heart of the
issue, must have been the feeling voiced in Monroe v. Pape by Justice
Douglas that it was historically logical for the federal courts to be
involved in this area even though state-created rights and remedies were
available which could be pursued in the state courts. It would seem that
the potential for a state court bias while reviewing challenged.actions
by state officials is greater than the potential for bias would be in the
federal courts. The logic of this can be fairly compared to the logic
underlying the existence of diversity jurisdiction. At least the members
of Congress in Reconstruction Days were openly unwilling to permit
local state magistrates to adjudicate the changed personal relations the
war had brought about, hence these Civil Rights statutes. This effort to
obviate possibilities of bias had been activated early in our history by
the creation of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts.
This was even then thought desirable because of the likelihood that
there might be a state court bias against the out-of-state litigant, a bias
conjectured even then to be great enough for Congress to afford a
federal court alternative. It was in light of these and similar policy
considerations that I think the Supreme Court decided to read the Civil
Rights Acts, particularly section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. section 1343(3)
(defining district court jurisdiction over section 1983 cases), so as to
preserve the thought that the Reconstruction Congressmen had: that
there should be a federal forum for pursuing claims against state offi-
cers.
Needless to say, this decision has brought about an immense in-
crease in the work load of the federal courts. Indeed, federal jurisdiction
has been extended so as to encompass a broad variety of cases, some of
which legal traditionalists, I think it is fair to say, quite honestly believe
could have been left to the state courts to resolve. I have in mind a
number of recent cases which at first glance involve garden variety state
tort actions, but when viewed through the prism of section 1983 become
diffused into rainbows of federally enforceable claims.
At one end of that spectrum are the cases involving false arrests
like the situation in the Pape case. Perhaps these arrest cases, which
involve actual official restraints upon the liberty of the individual, most
clearly involve questions of a constitutional nature. The federal courts
have shown a readiness to provide a forum in these cases, and that is
how it should be. Closely analogous to these cases are ones involving
allegations by state prisoners that they have been deprived of their civil
rights while confined in state institutions. I have consistently stated my
belief that state prisoners should have recourse to the federal courts ever
since my judgeship experience began more than sixteen years ago, and
I believe the Second Circuit has an enviable record of accomplishment
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in this area. I firmly believe that prior to my Noia v. Fay' decision,
which was, of course, a habeas case, the state courts simply were not
doing their jobs in this area, mostly because legislatures had not adopted
post-conviction remedy statutes. The landmark Supreme Court case of
Fay v. Noia,7 our Second Circuit case upon appeal, opened the door for
corrective action in legislatures and courthouses everywhere.
Beyond these cases lie a myriad of complicated claims, some per-
haps twisted a bit in the plaintiffs' complaints to fit the requirement of
section 1983 that a constitutional claim be involved. By way of example
I might cite York v. Story.8 The case involved outrageous conduct by
the police. Angelynn York in 1958 went to the police station in Chino,
California, to report an assault upon her person. An officer of the police
department, acting under the color of his authority, advised Miss York
that it would be necessary to take photographs of her. She was then
taken into a room and directed to remove her clothes for the pictures.
She did so over objection and eventually posed for the pictures in the
nude. The pictures, however, were not used to serve the ends of justice
but rather were distributed to the policeman's colleagues on the force.
Miss York sued in a federal court, alleging a claim under section 1983,
and the district court dismissed on the ground that she had not stated a
federal cause of action. Clearly, the case involved an act by a state
officer contemplated by the section, a particularly obnoxious act for
which she certainly could recover compensatory damages at common
law, but was there any deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the United States Constitution and federal laws? Her lawyer
argued to no avail in the district court that the officer's act constituted
an unreasonable search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
That argument wasn't without some justification, but the Ninth Circuit
wasn't ready to buy it. They did, however, go along with the argument
that the police officers had unreasonably invaded Miss York's privacy
protected by the fourth amendment. And so, Angelynn York got her
federal forum. Yet, I'm not so sure that in this kind of case the state
courts wouldn't have done as good a job for her as the federal courts
did. Unlike the usual false arrest case defense, the policemen here could
not have made that all too appealing claim that they were only doing
their duty. Moreover, while I might disapprove of illegally obtained
nude pictures, I am not totally convinced that the claim arising there-
from is of a constitutional nature. It seems to me that a common-law
action in tort, an action best left to the state courts, is adequate.
6. United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), affd, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
7. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
8. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
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I feel even more strongly about the student length-of-hair cases
which are popping up in federal courts through the workings of section
1983. Now that we judges have to look to the Constitution to tell liti-
gants when to get haircuts, perhaps we should suggest that complainants
emulate the Immortal Founders, and, like them, begin to wear pow-
dered wigs. As of today, four circuits have ruled that a male attending
a public educational institution may invoke the Constitution to protect
his civil rights to wear shoulder-length hair; four circuits have held
otherwise; and the Supreme Court, which we have always supposed had
a duty to resolve constitutional conflicts between circuits, has several
times denied certiorari For better or for worse, hair styles have now
become the subject of constitutional adjudication in the federal courts.
That the federal courts have become a forum for such grievances
involves, to my mind, a pretty sweeping change in judicial policy. In-
deed, it has far-reaching implications in the area of federal-state rela-
tionships. The change, obviously indicative of a growth of federal perva-
siveness, did not come about through recent action by either of the
organs of government traditionally charged with making policy determi-
nations in the public interest. It came about because the Supreme Court
breathed new life into an old statute.
But, after all, this "breathing" is not a newly discovered mouth-
to-mouth form of resuscitation. Blackstone said: "[T]he public good is
in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every
individual's private rights .... "I'
So, even antedating the drafting of the Bill of Rights 180 years ago
and the post-Civil War amendments 100 years ago, the common-law
sage put his finger on the proper conceptual relationship between man
and the officers of his governments long before these days when, on the
one hand, individuals are so religiously pursuing their private rights and,
on the other hand, other individuals are urging upon government that
government officers should enlarge the spheres of government activity.
It is a platitude, a truly commonplace statement, that American
constitutional law is "not a fixed body of truth but a mode of social
9. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Compare Massie v. Henry, 455
F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970), with Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032
(1972); King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
979 (1971); Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Jackson v. Dorrier,
424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School
Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
10. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
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adjustment." Indeed the Constitution owes its continuity to our need to
have a vigorous organic law that will continuously meet the progress of
change in our economic affairs, accommodate itself to our changing
ideas of privacy, and be able to deal with our present national preoccu-
pations with the elimination of geographic distances through increased
vehicular speed and the removal of social distinctions through the elimi-
nation of societal barriers.
Time was, when used in connection with a business or political
endeavor, the phrase "affected with the public interest" was pretty much
limited to those occupations that were or ought to be regulated because,
in a limited sense of community impact, it seemed clear to lawmakers
that the businesses were subject to some legislative control for the public
good. These included, for example, common carriers and innkeepers.
We now find that all citizen activities except reading Mother Goose
stories to one's grandchildren at bedtime have become of interest to
lawmakers, and I'm not positively sure about that one either. At the
lowest level of interest are the licensing statutes and ordinances, usually
sought by the occupationists themselves, master barbers, master plumb-
ers, master electricians, master-this and master-that (with, if possible,
of course, grandfather clauses to protect those already in the club). At
the highest and latest level in the furtherance of the new concepts of
activities affected with the public interest are those businesses which
have attracted the attention of those who would try to preserve our open
spaces, our endangered wildlife, our essential natural assets of unsoiled
air and land and water-the environmentalists.
Within the orbit of regulatory control, the various Courts of Ap-
peals have been charged by the Congress with "sitting on top" of the
formidable administrative agencies of the federal government, agencies
which by regulatory action pretty much tell all of us what the patterns
of our lives are to be. To mention just a few: the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Com-
munications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (in part), the National Labor Relations Board, the
Social Security Administration, the Tax Court, the Maritime Adminis-
tration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Service Com-
mission, and many others. And, of course, although not quite in the
same way, all the bureaus of all the government departments as well.
In fact, it is quite an unsophisiticated businessman these days who
doesn't know more about the regulations affecting his business than any
lawyer or judge, brought in cold, could pick up in a short-time examina-
tion of his particular problem. Hence, if I may say so, the recourse of
us legally trained characters when challenging such a regulation is to
resort to the somewhat vague shibboleths of "due process" and "equal
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protection." If the administrative agency appears to be acting une-
qually, without giving enough notice to allow for the obtaining of legal
advice, or harshly, one is accustomed to fall back upon a "capricious
and unreasonable" allegation, trumpet the shibboleths, and request the
courts to issue injunctions.
Now in addition to these warcries, if the administrative agency is
not federal, but belongs to a state, or to a state's political subdivision,
the aggrieved person finds himself also aggrieved because his guaranteed
civil rights have been impinged upon as well as his having been denied
due process and equal protection. Thus, the district courts are impor-
tuned by utilization of section 1983 to issue an injunction against the
state's enforcement of its laws, regulations, or even the provisions of its
own constitution which its officers have sworn to protect and defend.
So the federal courts now get it both ways, and the definition of what
constitutes the public interest seems to be intertwined with the constitu-
tional issues inherent in section 1983. As a result, it can well turn out
that fair administrative conduct properly required of the large, well-
staffed federal agencies may be unfairly imposed upon the state agencies
as the same cadre of judges review the acts of each.
Anyway, it seems clear that as the area of accommodation gets
narrower and narrower, as our free-breathing space under the thoracic
ribs of our conventional federalism gets more and more circumscribed,
and as the individual's rights are more and more sublimated to the
licensing powers of political entities (including cities and other subdivi-
sions), more and more persons are finding that they are now allegedly
being deprived of liberty without due process of law as more and more
vocations and more and more human activities are becoming "affected
with the public interest," while at the same time more and more citizens
are being "affected with a deprivation of their civil rights."
So, the underlying question recurs and recurs. How much of our
so-called "egalitarian independence" has already gone, and how much
more, if there's any more at all, is yet to go? The rule governing the
situation sounds fair and is simply stated: The term "liberty" has per-
mitted one to follow any vocation of his choosing, subject only to the
restraints necessary to promote the common welfare and to protect the
public health or safety from the dangers to health or safety inherent in
the nature of the vocation.
The discoveries of recent months have indicated that this simple
statement must now be weighed in the light of those discoveries and that
a number of businesses alleged to have been conducted too casually or
without proper regard to which of their products should be offered to
unsophisticated consumers are likely to find that they are now "affected
with the public interest." Surely, it seems likely that even the areas
1972]
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hitherto reserved for control by self-regulating bodies, the stock ex-
changes or the baseball world, for example, may find that self-
regulation is suspect. It has been in the movie industry for quite some
little time. And, attacked by civil rights petitioners, areas and opportun-
ities hitherto devoted to the use of only some of the people are now being
required by judicial decree to be devoted to the use of all of the people.
A classic definition of "public interest" has been "some interest by
which the legal rights or liabilitites of the community at large are af-
fected." As the legal rights of individuals have been expanded-and the
community liabilities correlatively so-the "public interest" has taken
on new meaning. If the legislatures do not recognize the legislative
responsibility, I submit, though it is a truism and an unfortunate one
that "[Jiudges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as
expounders of what is called public policy,"" that it is the judges who
will have this responsibility of redefinition. I hope that the courts, intelli-
gently and conscientiously guided by a dedicated bar, will be careful in
this endeavor of definition and redefinition in the light of the ongoing
needs in this area of public interest. It may well be that the longtime
devotion of judges to the protection of the minorities from any unprinci-
pled action of the majorities will be called upon to protect those dwin-
dling groups of citizens who wish privacy, despite the cost, personal
inconvenience, or necessity for resisting government pressures to keep
it.
After all, is it not more desirable to be left alone than to be overseen
in minute detail because one is a member of a body politic that has
public problems?
But after all, is it not even more desirable to act positively to
preserve the way of life we have known for those who come after us
despite the great changes we are undergoing during our time of transi-
tion?
And lastly, after all, is there really an unpleasant dichotomy here,
an interest balancing too difficult to balance evenly? Or rather, isn't
there a public or private accommodation still possible between our right
to be left alone and the denial of that right to us as more and more of
what we do is affected with the public interest?
I will not leave you with these questions if you will permit me to
return to some remarks I made a few years ago in another connection.
I would hope that we would always have in mind how fortunate we
university people are to have had a time for reflection upon our way of
life and an opportunity to be informed of the accommodations required
11. In re Mirams, [1891] 1 Q.B. 594, 595 (Cave, J.).
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between the rights and duties of the individual and the rights and duties
of the public at large if we are to keep a legal order based upon the
humanistic Western world philosophy we have inherited for the guid-
ance of our lives.
This function of accommodation is the problem all in public life are
daily charged with performing, and as for us appellate judges, particu-
larly those of us who sit in courts of last resort (and a federal court of
appeals for most practical purposes is a court of last resort), that prob-
lem, the major problem of human society, may be stated as combining
that degree of liberty without which law is tyranny with that degree of
law without which liberty becomes license.
Only by satisfactorily solving that problem may our institutions be
preserved for those who come after us. But I submit that this burden of
preserving democratic institutions properly falls upon university people
as much as it has fallen upon and will continue to fall upon judges.
We of the law and we who administer the law are challenged today
more acutely than ever before. Many serious-minded people question
whether the law is or can ever be an instrumentality of social justice.
Many of our citizens believe that, irrespective of the precepts of the law,
the administration of the law frequently has been used as a device to
frustrate the legitimate aspirations of those seeking to participate as
equals with other Americans in the benefits of American society.
The inclusion of more and more activities as activities "affected
with the public interest" is evidence that there are some who may be
hoping that by this enlargement the administration of law may, in truth,
become the instrumentality for social justice that they wish it to be.
In any event, may I close by suggesting that there is always a place
for idealism in the world and it is the especial privilege of university-
trained men and women to seek idealistic goals. And, I submit also that
I believe- it the especial privilege and professional duty of American
lawyers to preserve the American dream.
I thank you for letting me spend this time with you.
1972]

